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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j )
 f Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended. This matter may be transferred to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
There are three issues presented for review. 
1. Did the trial court have the power to grant 
appropriate relief to a party, if the party had not 
demanded such relief in its pleadings? 
2. Is the failure to comply with Rule 69 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure grounds to set aside a 
sheriff's sale of real property? 
3. Did any issue of material fact exist that would 
preclude the trial court from granting the judgment 
setting aside the sheriff's sale of the subject 
real property? 
(Note: The first and the third issues presented are 
essentially the identical issues claimed by the Appellant's 
Brief. The second issue was not covered by the Appellant's 
Brief.) 
The standard of review for the first issue was 
adequately stated by the Appellant and is restated for the 
court's convenience as follows: 
If the relief granted was not requested in 
the pleadings, is the party in whose favor it 
is rendered nevertheless entitled to that 
relief. URCP 54(c)(1). Did the failure to 
request the relief in question prejudice the 
opposing party in the preparation or trial of 
the case. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 
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(Utah 1987). However, the issue omitted in 
the pleadings must in fact be raised and the 
parties must be provided a full opportunity 
to meet it, Owen v. Owen, 734 P.2d 414 (Utah 
1986). In order to grant relief outside the 
pleadings, facts developed by the evidence 
must warrant the relief granted and that 
relief must be a permissible form of relief 
for the claims litigated. Butler v. 
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). Most, 
if not all cases granting relief under Rule 
54(c)(1), URCP, have done so in the context 
of relief being granted after trial where 
evidence has been received which bears upon 
the issues not framed by the pleadings. 
Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 
680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984). 
Brief of Appellants at page 1. 
The second issue raises the question of whether or not 
an execution sale should be set aside, which question rests 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. The standard of 
review for this issue is then whether the trial court abused its 
discretion. State vs. District Court, 403 P.2d 634 (Mont. 1965), 
Johnson vs. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 429 P.2d 474 
(Ariz. App. 1967), and generally 30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions 
Section 713. 
The standard of review for the third issue is 
adequately stated by the Appellant and is restated for the 
court's convenience as follows: 
An appeal from a motion for summary judgment 
first determines the existence of a genuine 
issue of any material fact. Rule 56(c), 
URCP. Provo City Corp. v. State of Utah, 795 
P.2d 1120 (Utah 1990). Facts and inferences 
drawn therefrom must be viewed in that light 
most favorable to the losing party. Provo 
City Corp., supra. In the absence of a 
genuine issue of a material fact, it must 
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then be determined whether the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Arrow Indus, v. Zion's First Nat'l Bank, 7 67 
P.2d 935 (Utah 1988). In the absence of a 
material fact, the appellate court is free to 
reappraise the legal conclusions of the trial 
court. Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578 
(Utah App. 1990)? Shire Development v. 
Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 221, (Utah 
App. 1990). 
Brief of Appellants at page 2. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The interpretation of portions of Rules 54 and 69 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure will be determinative of the 
outcome of this matter. 
The pertinent portion of Rule 54 is as follows: 
(c) Demand for Judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party 
against whom a judgment is entered by 
default, every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it 
is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings. It may be given for or against 
one or more of several claimants; and it may, 
when the justice of the case requires it, 
determine the ultimate rights of the parties 
on each side as between or among themselves. 
Rule 54(c)(1). 
The pertinent portion of Rule 69 is as follows: 
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every 
bid shall be deemed an irrevocable offer? and 
if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount 
bid by him for the property struck off to him 
at a sale under execution, the officer may 
again sell the property at any time to the 
highest bidder, and if any loss is occasioned 
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thereby, the party refusing to pay, in 
addition to being liable on such bid, is 
guilty of a contempt of court and may be 
punished accordingly. When a purchaser 
refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his 
discretion, thereafter reject any other bid 
of such person. 
Rule 69(e) (4). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 6, 1989, the Sheriff of Wayne County attempted 
to conduct an execution sale on certain real property located in 
Wayne County. The questions presented in this declaratory 
judgment action and now raised on appeal arise from that action. 
Thomas Farr, the Plaintiff and Appellee (hereafter 
Farr) was attempting to execute against real property owned by 
Earl B. Brinkerhoff and/or Eunice Brinkerhoff (hereafter 
Brinkerhoffs). At the sheriff's sale only Farr, through his 
counsel, bid. Minutes before the sale Brinkerhoffs had a 
homestead declaration and a "correction" deed filed, both of 
which documents appeared to affect the real property being sold. 
No money was ever sought by the Sheriff pursuant to 
Farr's bid. Some seven weeks after the purported sale, 
Brinkerhoffs' attorney demanded a sum of money from Farr's 
attorney. 
In order to clarify the situation, Farr filed a 
declaratory judgment action raising three causes of action for 
determination: 
1. When was the claimed homestead allowance money 
payable? 
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2. What was the effect of the "correction" deed, what 
interest did Farr really purchase at the sale, and 
was the earlier dismissal of Farr's action against 
Brinkerhoff for fraudulent conveyance obtained by 
fraud? 
3. Whether the judgment debtors, the Brinkerhoffs, 
could claim any money was due to them or whether 
their only remedy was redemption? 
Brinkerhoffs then counterclaimed seeking payment of the 
homestead allowance and the asserted over bid amount. 
Both parties then filed Motions for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court reviewed the motions and issued an Order on 
August 21, 1989, wherein it found an issue of fact regarding 
Eunice Brinkerhoffs claim of ownership in the real property and 
found only an "issue", not an "issue in fact", regarding whether 
the sale was consummated. The court went on to order the parties 
to appear and show cause why the Sheriff's sale should not be set 
aside and why Eunice Brinkerhoffs interest should not be 
determined prior to re-execution on Farr's judgment. 
On July 11, 1990, the show cause proceeding was held. 
Neither side presented evidence. Farr conceded that Eunice 
Brinkerhoff should be an interest holder in the real property. 
Farr also agreed that the sheriff's sale should be set aside. 
Brinkerhoff maintained it should not be set aside. The trial 
court then granted Eunice Brinkerhoff an interest in the real 
property and set aside the sheriffs sale, dismissing the 
declaratory judgment action. 
The homestead allowance and interest of Eunice 
Brinkerhoff issues are not raised by this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In 1980 the Brinkerhoffs purchased the real 
property at issue in this cause. They took title as joint 
tenants by warranty deed (R.63). 
2. A judgment against Mr. Brinkerhoff was rendered in 
Alaska on September 20, 1985 for $65,520.20 in favor of Farr 
(R.13, 14, 66, 155). 
3. Shortly thereafter the Brinkerhoffs created EBB, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, and conveyed the subject real property 
to that corporation by deed dated December 23, 1985, (R.65, 155). 
The consideration flowing to Brinkerhoffs for the conveyance of 
the land to EBB, Inc., was the ownership of the new corporation, 
although actual stock certificates were not issued (R.60, 65, 
66) . 
4. After domesticating his judgment in Utah, Farr 
filed suit against the Brinkerhoffs and EBB, Inc., seeking to 
avoid as a fraudulent conveyance the December 23, 1985, deed to 
the corporation (R.10, 11, 12, 155, 156). 
5. Subsequently, Mr. Brinkerhoff personally met with 
Paul D. Lyman, counsel for Farr, on November 23, 1988, to discuss 
that fraudulent conveyance action (R.156). This meeting resulted 
in an agreement for the suit to be dismissed in return for a deed 
conveying the real property from EBB, Inc., to Mr. Brinkerhoff 
individually (R.156). Mr Lyman drafted the deed, and Mr. 
Brinkerhoff signed it as corporate agent for EBB, Inc. (R.17, 66, 
156) . 
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6. Farr's counsel advised Mr. Brinkerhoff during this 
meeting that the deed would completely divest Mrs. Brinkerhoff of 
her interest in the property (R.156). Mr. Brinkerhoff later 
denied that he intended to divest his wife or the corporation of 
their interests in the property, and that he had the right or 
power to do so, and suggested that Farr's counsel took advantage 
of him (R.66f 67). 
7. Neither Farr, his counsel nor Mr. Brinkerhoff had 
contact regarding these matters with Mrs. Brinkerhoff at that 
time, and she later stated that she "did not agree to, approve 
of, or acquiesce in" a deed which divested the corporation of its 
title to the land, and never "waived any claim she had in" the 
land or the corporation (R.60). 
8. Mr. Brinkerhoff claims the subject real porperty 
had a fair market value in 1980, before improvements, of 
$257,413.00 (R.65). In 1986, after improvements, it appraised 
for $350,500.00 (R.65). At the time of the Sheriff's sale, the 
property was encumbered by a mortgage to First Security Bank in 
the amount of $110,000.00 (R.67). 
9. Farr executed against the property and a sheriff's 
sale occurred on March 6, 1989, (R.67, 157). Farr did not 
personally attend the sale, but was represented by his counsel 
who bid on his behalf (R.3, T.12). Farr was the only bidder. 
His bid amount was $121,416.05, but he did not pay the bid 
(R.67). 
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10. Immediately prior to the sale, Mr. Brinkerhoff 
recorded a homestead claim for $10f000.00f and a "correction" 
deed to the property which vested title in him and his wife 
jointly (R.67). Before making the bid, Farr's counsel reviewed 
both the homestead declaration and the correction deed, and 
discussed those instruments by telephone with counsel for 
Brinkerhoffs (T.12). 
11. Mr. Brinkerhoff claims that Farr's Alaska judgment 
totalled $89,306.72 on the date of sale (R.68). 
12. Following the sale, Farr's counsel prepared a 
Certificate of Sale and secured the signature thereto of the 
Deputy Wayne County Sheriff who conducted the sale (R.3, 26, 27), 
the latter having signed the Certificate on March 17, 1989 
(R.27), eleven days after the sale. 
13. By letter dated April 25, 1989, counsel for 
Brinkerhoffs requested that Farr pay his bid (R.3, 28, 29). Farr 
responded by filing the underlying declaratory judgment action 
against Brinkerhoffs dated May 4, 1989, seeking certain relief as 
to (a) the time when payment of the homestead allowance should be 
made, (b) the interest, if any, of Mrs. Brinkerhoff in the 
subject real property, and (c) whether redemption was available 
to Brinkerhoffs for an amount less than Farr's bid (R.l-6). 
Brinkerhoffs answered the Complaint, contending that relief 
thereunder was improper, and counterclaimed for (a) an 
adjudication that Mrs. Brinkerhoff owned one-half of the land, 
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and (b), in essence, for the court to confirm the sheriff's sale 
and grant a judgment against Farr (R.32-37). 
14. In June, 1989f Farr moved for summary judgment 
(R.40, 41), without affidavits to support the motion, but a 
memorandum was filed claiming the same relief as his Complaint 
(R.42-54). Brinkerhoffs then moved for summary judgment (R.134-
142), supporting their motion with affidavits and other documents 
(R.57-133). 
15. On August 21, 1989, the District Court issued an 
Order, wherein the pending motions for summary judgment were 
denied because "an issue of fact" existed regarding Mrs. 
Brinkerhoffs ownership in the property and because "an issue" 
existed regarding whether the sale was consummated, when it was 
uncertain what was sold and when the bid price was not paid 
(R.145). The court went on to order the parties to appear and 
show cause why the sheriff's sale should not be set aside and why 
Mrs. Brinkerhoff's interest should not be determined prior to 
further execution on the judgment (R.145). 
16. In response to the court's Order, Farr's counsel 
filed an Affidavit, entitled "Proferred Testimony of Paul D. 
Lyman," which fully explained the events that occurred in the 
November 23, 1988, meeting of the affiant and Mr. Brinkerhoff, 
which explanation contraverted what Mr. Brinkerhoff had earlier 
asserted regarding his wife's interest in the subject real 
property (R.155-157). 
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17. On July 11, 1990, the court directed show cause 
hearing occurred and neither side presented any additional 
evidence, but both counsel argued at length (R.151, 152). 
18. At the hearing Farr's counsel conceded on the 
issue of Mrs. Brinkerhoff's interest in the real property (R.151, 
152 and T.4). Neither party has appealed that issue and it is 
resolved (R. 151, 152). 
19. At the hearing the court refused to consider any 
homestead issue and neither party has appealed that issue (T.27). 
20. During the course of the July 11, 1990, hearing, 
Brinkerhoffs, though their attorney, acknowledged that the 
sheriff's sale was defective. This happened in a discussion 
between the court and counsel that went as follows: 
THE COURT: At the time it was sold, they were supposed 
to get the money right then, weren't they? 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. 
THE COURT: And they didn't get it? 
MR. TAYLOR: They never got anything. No money was 
paid. 
THE COURT: All right. So the sale was defective in 
that regard. 
MR. TAYLOR: In that regard, 
(T.8, 9) 
21. However, Brinkerhoffs, through their attorney, 
later argued that the admittedly defective sheriff's sale should 
not be set aside (T.19). 
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22. The court ultimately set aside the sheriff's sale 
and dismissed the declaratory judgment action (R.152, T. 25, 26). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT HAVE THE POWER TO GRANT APPROPRIATE 
RELIEF TO A PARTY, IF THE PARTY HAD NOT DEMANDED 
SUCH RELIEF IN ITS PLEADINGS? 
Rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
allows a court to grant relief to which a party is entitled, even 
though it is not demanded in its pleadings. Through case law 
interpretation of this rule, the Utah Supreme Court has said that 
the non-pleaded relief is only authorized ' on issues that were 
either raised or tried at the trial court level. Combe vs. 
Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984) and 
cases cited therein. 
The issue of whether the subject sheriff's sale should 
be set aside was directly raised by the Brinkerhoffs' motion for 
summary judgment, which sought for confirmation of the sale. It 
was directly raised by the court's Order of August 21, 1989, 
wherein the court ordered the parties to appear and show cause 
why the sale should not be set aside. Thus, the relief granted 
to Farr in setting aside the sheriff's sale, although not raised 
by the initial pleadings, was clearly raised and it was within 
the court's power to grant the relief it did. 
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POINT II 
IS THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 69 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE GROUNDS TO SET ASIDE A SHERIFF'S 
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY? 
Local district courts control the processes that arise 
after judgments are effected. Failure to comply with Rule 69 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has been grounds to set aside a 
sheriff's sale of real property. Taubert v. Roberts, 747 P.2d 
1046 (Utah 1987). 
The trial court correctly reviewed whether the subject 
sheriff's sale complied with Rule 69 and, after allowing all 
parties to respond, concluded that the sheriff's sale was 
defective and should be set aside. This was a discretionary act 
and, absent an abuse of this discretion, should not be reversed. 
POINT III 
DID ANY ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST THAT WOULD PRECLUDE 
THE TRIAL COURT FROM GRANTING THE JUDGMENT SETTING 
ASIDE THE SHERIFF'S SALE OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY? 
For the trial court to make its ruling, there had to be 
no remaining material issues of fact. The court's determination 
turned on two material issues of fact. First, what interest did 
Mrs. Brinkerhoff have in the subject real property? This issue 
was resolved by Farr conceding Mrs. Brinkerhoff's interest. 
Second, was the bid price paid? The fact the bid was not paid 
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was acknowledged by Brinkerhoffs' attorney at the July 11, 1990, 
hearing. 
There may be other factual issues, but they are not 
material to the court's decision to set aside the sheriff's sale. 
Consequently, they can be ignored. The court's order setting 
aside the sale for failure to comply with Rule 69 was not 
precluded by any material issues of fact. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT HAVE THE POWER TO GRANT APPROPRIATE 
RELIEF TO A PARTY, IF THE PARTY HAD NOT DEMANDED 
SUCH RELIEF IN ITS PLEADINGS? 
Rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
controls this issue. It reads as follows: 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party 
against whom a judgment is entered by 
default, every final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor 
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings. It may be given for or against 
one or more of several claimants; and it may, 
when the justice of the case requires it, 
determine the ultimate rights of the parties 
on each side as between or among themselves. 
A leading case that interprets and applies this rule is 
Combe vs. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 
1984). In Combe the Supreme Court presented the general rule 
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that arises from Rule 54(c) (1), when the court began its 
analysis, as follows: 
It is a rule of long standing that every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. Rule 
54(c)(1), Utah R.Civ.P.; Behrens v. Raleigh 
Hills Hospital, Inc., Utah, 675 P.2d 1179 
(1983), and cases there cited. However, 
findings which are at variance with the 
claims of both parties are not favored and 
are carefully scrutinized on review. West v. 
West, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965). 
Although Rule 54(c)(1) permits relief on 
grounds not pleaded, that rule does not go so 
far as to authorize the granting of relief on 
issues neither raised nor tried. Cornia v. 
Cornia, Utah, 546 P.2d 890 (1976). 
Combe, at 735. (Emphasis added.) 
The Wayne County trial court in the case at hand did 
enter a final judgment granting relief that neither party had 
specifically demanded in its initial pleadings. Pursuant to Rule 
54(c)(1) and the interpretation of Rule 54(c)(1) as presented in 
Combe, the propriety of such an action turns upon the question of 
whether the relief granted related to issues "raised" or "tried" 
by the pleadings. Combe, at 735. There was no trial so the only 
question is whether the relief granted was based upon issues 
"raised" in the proceedings. 
Just as every coin has only two sides, an obverse side 
and a reverse side, every sheriff's sale has only two sides, a 
confirmed sale or a set aside sale. If either party seeks to 
have the subject sheriff's sale confirmed, then the issue of 
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whether the sale ought to be set aside is correspondingly 
raised. 
Farr's declaratory action Complaint sought an 
interpretation of how the actions prior to, at, and after the 
purported sheriff's sale should be construed, which raised the 
issue of whether the sale should be set aside. Brinkerhoffs 
counterclaim raised the same sale set aside questions. 
Brinkerhoffs' attorney acknowledged in the Brief of 
Appellants, the following: 
Brinkerhoffs also moved for summary judgment, 
asking that the Sheriff's sale be confirmed, 
in essence, and that Farr be compelled to pay 
his bid, or in the alternative, for judgment 
against Farr. 
Brief of Appellants at page 11. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, Brinkerhoffs' own Brief acknowledges that the 
issues of "sale confirmation" and, by logical inference, its 
opposite, "sale set aside", were raised by the pleadings. 
Furthermore, the trial court by its Order of August 21, 
1989, ruling on the parties' motions for summary judgment, 
specifically stated as follows: 
There is an issue if the sale was 
consummated. 
(R.145) 
The court then went on to state as follows: 
Both parties are ordered to appear and show 
cause why the court should not set aside the 
Sheriff's sale. . . 
(R.145) 
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The court then left it up to the parties to arrange a hearing on 
these issues. 
On July 11, 1990, almost one year later, the 
anticipated hearing was held. Had Brinkerhoff chosen to present 
evidence on the set aside issue, which was clearly raised by the 
court in its Order of August 21, 1989, he could have done so. 
Instead, neither party presented evidence, both sides choosing to 
simply present additional argument on the issues that had been 
raised. The trial court then granted the relief it felt was 
appropriate, which conformed to the issues that had been raised. 
Brinkerhoff is hard pressed to now somehow claim that 
the trial court stepped outside of its bounds of power and 
granted relief on issues that were not "raised". Rule 54(c)(1) 
as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in Combe and the other 
cited cases was properly followed and the action of the trial 
court should be affirmed. The issue of the sheriff's sale's 
validity was squarely raised and properly before the court. The 
relief granted to Farr, which had not been specifically raised by 
the initial pleadings, was appropriate and within the court's 
power to grant. 
POINT II 
IS THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 69 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE GROUNDS TO SET ASIDE A SHERIFF'S 
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY? 
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A. Who Controls Enforcements of Post-Judgment Processes? 
Before the issue raised in this section is addressed, a 
foundation issue needs to be addressed. That foundation issue 
is, "Who controls the enforcement of post-judgment processes?" 
It is axiomatic that the local district court must 
have the power to control the processes that arise after 
judgments are effected. The general rule is as follows: 
There are numerous references in cases to the 
right of a court to grant relief from an 
execution by vacation thereof. This is true, 
not only of a writ of execution, . . ., but 
also of particular steps taken thereunder, 
such as the levy, sale, and deed. Such power 
of the court, arising from its complete 
control of its own process, is inherent. . . 
30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions Section 711. 
Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
acknowledges the control of the local district courts over the 
processes arising from their rulings as the following excerpts 
from Rule 69 demonstrate: 
Process to enforce a judgment shall be by a 
writ of execution unless the court otherwise 
directs, . . . 
Rule 69(a) (Emphasis added.) 
The writ of execution must be issued in the 
name of the State of Utah, sealed with the 
seal of the court and subscribed by the 
clerk. . . . 
Rule 69(b) (Emphasis added.) 
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B. Is The Failure To Comply With Rule 69 Grounds To Set Aside A 
Sheriff's Sale Of Real Property? 
Rule 69(e)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
controls this issue. It reads as follows: 
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every 
bid shall be deemed an irrevocable offer; and 
if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount 
bid by him for the property struck off to him 
at a sale under execution, the officer may 
again sell the property at any time to the 
highest bidder, and if any loss is occasioned 
thereby, the party refusing to pay, in 
addition to being liable on such bid, is 
guilty of a contempt of court and may be 
punished accordingly. When a purchaser 
refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his 
discretion, thereafter reject any other bid 
of such person. 
There appears to be no Utah case law that directly 
interprets Subsection (e)(4) of Rule 69. However, Subsection 
(e)(1) has been the subject of the Utah Supreme Court's 
interpretation in the case of Taubert vs. Roberts, 747 P.2d 1046 
(Utah 1987). 
In Taubert, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a ruling by 
the trial court, which lower court ruling had upheld the validity 
of a sheriff's sale of real property. The Supreme Court held 
that the steps specified by Rule 69(e)(1) were necessary to levy 
on real property and that the required steps had not begun within 
the time allowed by the rule. Consequently, the Taubert sale was 
set aside. Taubert, at 1050. 
Applying the Subsection (e)(1) standard to Subsection 
(e)(4), if the trial court concluded that the sheriff's sale of 
the Brinkerhoff property was not consummated or was faulty in 
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that it failed to comply with the necessary steps under 
Subsection (e)(4), then the trial court can set aside the sale. 
The trial court does this as a part of its power to 
control the processes that arise relating to real property within 
its district. (Note: The process in the case at hand arose from 
a foreign judgment, which no one disputes was properly filed and 
docketed in Wayne County. It is entitled to full faith and 
credit in Utah.) 
Brinkerhoff argues that Occidental/Nebraska Federal 
Savings v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990), controls the 
situation presented in this appeal. (Note: Occidental is also 
the case that Brinkerhoff presented to the court for its review 
at the July 11, 1990, hearing.) The Occidental case can be 
distinguished from the present case because Occidental involved a 
"trustee sale" and the present case involved a "judicial 
execution sale". 
Although there are some similarities between a trustee 
sale and a judicial execution sale, the creditor can directly 
control a trustee sale, whereas the court, through the county 
sheriff, controls judicial execution sales. The Occidental case 
turned on asserted deficiencies that were under the control of 
the creditor, whereas in the present the debtor or the sheriff 
controlled the asserted deficiencies. 
In the present case the trial court correctly asked if 
the sheriff's sale had been consummated, i.e., was Rule 69 
complied with or not. When it was unclear what had been sold 
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(due to Brinkerhoff's last minute filing of a homestead 
declaration and a questionable "correction" deed) and it was 
clear that the bid price had not been paid, the trial court 
issued an Order requiring the parties to show cause why the sale 
should not be set aside. The trial court then allowed both 
parties to make additional presentations and arguments on the set 
aside issue. Finally, with its discretionary power, the trial 
court concluded Rule 69 had not been complied with and set aside 
the sheriff's sale of the subject real property. 
The standard for review of a discretionary act is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in so ruling. 
State vs. District Court, 403 P.2d 634 (Mont. 1965), Johnson vs. 
Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 429 P.2d 474 (Ariz App. 
1967) and 30 Am. Jur. 20 Executions Section 713. The trial 
court, in light of the Taubert decision regarding Subsection 
(e)(1) of Rule 69, acted cautiously and fairly and concluded that 
the sheriff's sale should be set aside. The sheriff's failure 
to follow Rule 69, constituted grounds for the trial court to 
exercise its discretion and set aside the sheriff's sale. This 
was appropriate and not an abuse of discretion. It should not be 
reversed. 
POINT III 
DID ANY ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST THAT WOULD PRECLUDE 
THE TRIAL COURT FROM GRANTING THE JUDGMENT SETTING 
ASIDE THE SHERIFF'S SALE OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY? 
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Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
in pertinent part the following: 
. . .The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact . . . . 
Almost an innumerable number of cases have confirmed this general 
rule. For the purpose of this appeal, the specific issue that 
needs to be more closely examined is, "does any material fact 
exist about which there is a genuine issue?" Heglar Ranch Inc. 
v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980). The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated: 
"The foregoing rule does not preclude summary 
judgment simply whenever some fact remains in 
dispute, but only when a material fact is 
genuinely controverted." 
Heglar, at 1391. 
The trial court made it very clear that its decision to 
set aside the sheriff's sale was because it did not believe the 
sale had been consummated. (See Order, August 21, 1989). The 
court questioned "what was sold?" It also questioned if a sale 
could happen "when (the) bid price was not paid?" Consequently, 
the trial court in making its ruling raised two factual issues 
that it felt were material. There may well be a number of other 
disputed facts, but the key question is, "was there a genuine 
controversy regarding the material facts?" 
The first material fact question was, "what interest in 
the real property did Mrs. Brinkerhoff have?" It remained a 
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genuine issue until the July 11, 1990, hearing. At that hearing 
Farr conceded that she had an interest in the real property. 
Thereafter, there was no longer a material issue of fact 
regarding that issue. 
The second material fact question was, "whether the bid 
price had been paid?" This fact was also not at issue as is 
shown by Brinkerhoffs' attorney's discussion with the court 
during the July 11, 1990, hearing: 
THE COURT: At the time it was sold, they were supposed 
to get the money right then, weren't they? 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. 
THE COURT: And they didn't get it? 
MR. TAYLOR: They never got anything. No money was 
paid. 
THE COURT: All right. So the sale was defective in 
that regard. 
MR. TAYLOR: In that regard. . . . 
Hearing on Order to Show Cause, Transcript of Proceedings, pages 
8 and 9. 
In the Brief of Appellants, under Point II, a series of 
asserted disputes surrounding non-material facts is raised, e.g., 
whether Farr's counsel was confused, what happened at an 
interview between Mr. Brinkerhoff and Farr's counsel many months 
prior to the sheriff's sale and whether the bid was reasonable. 
None of these asserted issues rises to the level of a material 
fact. If they are not material to the court's decision, then the 
court was not precluded from granting the judgment setting aside 
the sheriff's sale. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court setting in Wayne County had the 
power to grant Farr the relief to which he was ultimately 
entitled. The issue of the validity of the sheriff's sale had 
been raised. Pursuant to the court's powers under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and in light of the Utah Supreme Court's past 
handling of sheriff's sales, the court could use its discretion 
and set aside the subject sheriff's sale. There were no genuine 
issues of material fact and, consequently, the court was not 
precluded from issuing the judgment that it issued. 
The District Court's action should be affirmed. 
DATED this _, day of March, 1991. 
r 
K W [J - ^ Tv^ 
PAUL D. LYMAN vi 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was placed in the 
United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage 
<n h _ 
thereon fully prepaid on the * day of March, 1991, 
addressed as follows: 
Mr. Marcus Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 728 
Richfield, Utah 847-01 
1_^—:—5^ac 
^J 
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ADDENDUM 
TRIAL COURT ORDER, DATED AUGUST 21, 1989 
FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL, DATED AUGUST 15, 1990 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WAYNE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS FARR, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- O R D E R 
EARL BRINKERHOFF CIVIL NO. 1218 
and EUNICE BRINKERHOFF, 
Defendant. 
The Motions for Summary Judgment of the Plaintiff and 
Defendants are both denied for the following reasons: 
1. There is an issue of fact if Eunice Brinkerhoff 
has any ownership in that property allegedly sold. 
2. There is an issue if the sale was consumated. If 
so, what was sold, and if the court should allow 
same when bid price was not paid. 
Both parties are ordered to appear and show cause why 
the Court should not set aside the Sheriff's sale and why the interest 
of Eunice Brinkerhoff in the property should not be determined prior 
to execution on the foreign judgment. 
The date of hearing shall be set at the convenience of 
Court and Counsel. 
Dated this ^ / day of August, 19*89%^  \ 
9
 ~wr^ 
TIBBS/ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
DON V. TIBBSy 
Lh$ 
Civil // 1218 
Wayne County 
Order August, 1989. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the day of August, 1989, I mailed a copy of 
the above and foregoing Order to the following, postage pre-paid 
from offices at Manti, Utah: 
Marcus Taylor, Attorney for Defendants 
108 North Main, Richfield, Utah, 84701 
Paul D. Lyman, Attorney for Plaintiff 
Sevier County Courthouse, Richfield, Utah, 84701 
Carole B. Mellor 
District Court Administrator 
Paul D. Lyman #4522 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
250 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 896-6812 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WAYNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS FARR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EARL B. BRINKERHOFF and 
EUNICE BRINKERHOFF, 
Defendants. 
. ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
i Civil No. 1218 
This matter came before the Court on July 11, 1990
 f at the District 
Courtroom, Loaf Utah, before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs. The Plaintiff was 
present through counsel, Paul D. Lyman, and the Defendants were present 
through counsel, Marcus Taylor. After both parties having previously 
submitted Motions for Summary Judgment, the parties were ordered to appear 
before the Court and show cause why the Court should not set aside the 
Sheriff's sale and why the interest of Eunice Brinkerhoff in the property 
should not be determined prior to execution on the foreign judgment. Both 
counsel were allowed to argue at length and stated that their respective 
positions were before the Court through oral argument, previous written 
argument and affidavits on file. The counsel for the Plaintiff offered to 
concede that Eunice Brinkerhoff was a joint tenant in the property, if the 
Sheriff's sale was set aside. 
The Court, based upon the undisputed portions of the parties' 
affidavits in their respective motions for summary judgment, pointed out that 
on March 6, 1989, an execution sale of the Defendants' real property in Wayne 
/ 
Page 2—Order of Dismissal 
Thomas Farr vs. Earl B. Brinkerhoff, et al 
County was scheduled and conducted; that immediately prior to said sale, the 
Defendant, Earl B. Brinkerhoff, caused a "Warranty Deed (Correction)" along 
with a "Declaration of Homestead" to be filed with the Wayne County Recorder; 
that said correction deed purported to change the record ownership of said 
real property from just Earl B. Brinkerhoff to Earl B. Brinkerhoff and Eunice 
Brinkerhoff, as joint tenants; and that an amount was bid at the sale, which 
the Defendants claim was more than the debt, but no money was collected. 
The March 6, 1989, sale was not consummated because it is not clear 
what was being purchased and the bid price was not paid, and in light of this 
Court's ruling and the Plaintiff's offer to concede on the issue of Eunice 
Brinkerhoff being a joint tenant with Earl B. Brinkerhoff, there are no more 
issues to be tried. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
The Court then issued the following Order or Dismissal, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. The March 6, 1989, Sheriff's sale is set aside. 
2. Eunice Brinkerhoff is a joint tenant with Earl B. Brinkerhoff in 
the following described real property in Wayne County, Utah: 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of the Southwest 
quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 36, Township 
28 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian and running 
thence South 200 feet; thence West 200 feet; thence North 
200 feet; thence East 200 feet to point of beginning. 
3. This declaratory relief action is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of August, 1990. 
\ '1 ) 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: • v 
MtfW %i^c DON V. TIBBS DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MARCUS TAYLOR 
Attorney for Defer K% 
